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During Operation Desert Storm, the senior U.S. Marine
Headquarters used a Local Area Network for command and
control. Despite some limitations, the network was largely a
success. The opportunities for employing the network to a
greater extent for command and control are extensive. This
requires careful examination of the functions of command and
control and the capabilities of the system. Matching
functional requirements to system capabilities will lead to
optimum employment. Development of doctrine to use the
network, education on how to use it, and improvements in its
capability are all necessary. This technology is but one
example of the available information technologies that must be
harnessed for Marine Corps command and control to provide
effective support to combat forces. A mechanism must be
established for the Marine Corps to focus the efforts of
experienced Marine leaders, information technology developers,
and Fleet Marine Force system users to forge the vital link
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A. C4 AND THE WARRIOR
The world has entered an era of phenomenal expansion of
information technology. Such dramatic advances have taken
place only a few times in history. Johann Gutenberg's
printing press in 1436, Alexander Graham Bell's telephone in
1876, and Guglielmo Marconi's radio in 1895 each demonstrated
the impact that an advance in information technology can have
on the world. From faster computer chips to sophisticated
computer software to greater capacity transmission media,
information technology is providing fantastic opportunities
for progress. These advances hold great promise for military
command and control. A recent briefing by the J-6 of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff highlighted the opportunity available to
employ this technology to provide vital support to combat
forces:
"Intelligently and uniformly applied information
technology has the ability to greatly facilitate the C4I
support to the warrior" (Macke, 1992)
.
"The technology explosion in information systems hardware
and software has gifted the C4 Community with an enormous
capability to provide warfighting aids to the warrior on
the battlefield" (Macke, 1992).
Marine Corps doctrine summarizes both the basic functional
purpose of this technology and its limitations:
"Automated information system support, both tactical and
administrative, must expedite the flow of the right
information to the right place in a timely manner" (OH 2,
p. 4-2, 1987).
"Automated systems promote rapid processing, communicating
and presenting information to enhance, but not replace,
the manual warfighting process" (OH 6-1A, p. 6-1, 1988)
.
Change to time-tested ways is slow and sometimes costly in
resources. Many people question spending scarce budget
resources on unproven future systems that do not directly kill
enemy forces. Yet already, some of those future enemies are
beginning to employ the very technology in question:
• Previously unsophisticated enemies, including terrorists
and drug trafficking organizations, are now employing
sophisticated communication and computer technologies.
(Breth, 1990)
.
Acquisition decisions for the right future technologies
will require vision, leadership, commitment and a willingness
to adjust to both the changing threat and the available tools.
B. SOME DEFINITIONS
Some basic definitions are given below to establish a
foundation for the discussion that follows. Appendices A and
B provide explanations for other abbreviations and
terminology.
• LAN — (Local Area Network) a group of computers connected
by a communications channel covering a few km. or less.
• WAN — (Wide Area Network) very similar to a LAN, but
covering distances over a few km.
• Network Operating System — the control program that
allows all the computers on a network to communicate with
each other.
• Command and Control — a commander's responsibility to
direct the efforts of his organization. Accomplished
using many personnel, equipment, and procedures.
• Information Technology — computer and communication
industry products, hardware and software, that provide the
means to process information more effectively.
• Automated Systems — generally refers to groups of
computers netted together to share information such as
target resolution data, payroll statistics, or
intelligence reports.
C. PURPOSE
This thesis has a four-fold purpose:
• To recount the success of the Marine Corps command and
control data network in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
• To explore further applications of the network for command
and control.
• To recommend steps to expand employment of information
technology in the Marine Corps.
• To propose a philosophy for future command and control
development using advanced information technologies.
D. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Local Area Networks (LAN's) informally entered Marine
Corps' communications sometime in the middle 1980 's. By the
latter part of the decade, several commands were using LAN's
for non-critical command and control functions during
exercises. This experimentation with LAN technology
culminated in the selection of a standard network operating
system for the Marine Corps in 1989. Just over a year later,
the network was field-tested during Desert Storm. Those who
used the network in Southwest Asia generally evaluated it as
an enthusiastic success, despite some noted limitations.
That success suggests potential for more extensive
employment. To employ the network optimally requires a close
examination of both what the command and control requirements
are and what the system capabilities are. The network has a
significant capacity to focus information as demanded by
Marine Corps command and control (C2) doctrine. However, its
proper role in the C2 architecture must be carefully scripted
to take advantage of its strengths while preserving the
dominant position of the commander. Once the LAN's role is
determined, a resolute and deliberate effort will be required
to implement it throughout the Corps. Some issues to be
addressed include doctrine for LAN employment, education for
the users, and improvements to LAN capabilities.
This network represents the rush of new information
technologies crowding the commercial market each year. Which
ones have affordable military applications is a complex issue.
Matching affordable, available technology to current and
future requirements is a challenge that faces every business
or military acquisition planner. In the light of declining
manpower and budget resources, how can the Marine Corps find
the right answer? Again, the formula is vision, leadership,
and commitment with willingness to change.
E. SCOPE
This thesis includes a survey of Marine Corps local and
wide area networks employed during Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. A limited subjective evaluation of the system
performance is also provided. Next are discussion of the
command and control functions appropriate for the network and
some suggestions about how the system might fulfill those
functions. Some suggestions are also offered for putting the
system into use, for documenting its functions, and for
teaching its employment. Finally, future applications of
information technology similar to this network are discussed.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The next chapter is a case study of the employment of the
Marine Corps LANs and WAN during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. Chapter III then develops the future C4
potential of the system used in the war. The fourth chapter
discusses procedures to reach the potential outlined in the
previous chapter. The final chapter looks to the future to
forecast where the rapidly expanding information technologies
may lead.
II. THE CASE STUDY
A. CHRONOLOGY
1. Before the War
Before deploying to Southwest Asia, many Marine units
had established Local Area Networks (LAN) as part of their
command and control architecture. Particularly on the West
Coast, LAN's had grown in popularity and were used in most
exercises to send messages between major command headquarters.
While LAN employment was not extensive or critical to pre-war
command and control, the experience gained by the data
processors and communicators in developing the system was to
pay huge dividends in the desert. (Hall, 1991)
During Gallant Knight 88, a CENTCOM exercise, I Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) directed all major subordinate
commands to establish contact on the MEF LAN. This resulted
in an attempt to field test several different LAN operating
systems and highlighted Banyan Vines as the clearly superior
software. (Hall, 1991)
This exercise also demonstrated some shortcomings of
the system. First, it was limited to unclassified traffic so
that very few operational messages could cross the network.
Consequently, some important high-visibility uses for the
network were absent. Secondly, there was some reluctance to
use automation before the war. Old habits, skepticism of
system reliability, and lack of education and training, were
all causes for this reluctance. (Hall, 1991)
In July 1990, just before the war, the MEF had an
opportunity to use the network in another CENTCOM exercise.
This exercise became a rehearsal for many network functions
used extensively in the war. However, the intelligence and
operational use of the network remained limited because
transmission security had not improved. Consequently,
logisticians and administrators became more familiar with the
network than other staff sections. Other combat uses of the
system had to be learned by trial and error under pressure
during Desert Shield. These exercises not only developed
network familiarity, but also established the same standard
for use of the network in the field as in garrison.
Additionally, embark procedures were developed for even the
non-tactical components. (Hall, 1991)
2. Initial Setup and Evolution in Southwest Asia
a. The Plan
During the planning stages of Desert Shield,
Ground Mobile Forces (GMF) Systems (Joint Satellite System)
were expected to provide primary connectivity for the Marine
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) headquarters to its Main
Subordinate Elements (MSE) . Multichannel radio (AN/GRC-201)
was to provide secondary connectivity to the MSE's and links
to other widely dispersed units. As more forces arrived in
theater, the demand for information channels rapidly out-paced
the primary communication nets and the roles of GMF and
multichannel radios were reversed. This reversal was the
direct result of increased LAN use. (9th Comm Bn, 1991)
b. In the Beginning
The prewar exercise use of the network paid off.
As headquarters were set up, the exercise routines for
establishing the data nets were followed, though transmission
security remained a problem. To overcome the security
limitation, STU III secure telephones were used to provide
slow data transfer at 2400 bits/sec. While this was not the
most desirable arrangement, the system was at least
operational and secure for the opening days of Desert Shield.
As units arrived, they were added to the network and equipment
was expanded to provide additional and improved capability.
(Cheatam, 1991)
c. Improvements to the Network
To improve the data rate, Digital Subscriber Voice
Terminals (DVST) , KY-68, were substituted for the STU Ill's
raising the rate to 9600 bits/sec. Eventually Dedicated Loop
Encryption Devices (DLED) , KG-84, were inserted to provide 32
K bits/sec service. A variety of computer terminals were
used, including AN/UYK-83's and 85' s and commercial PC's, both
table top versions and laptops. The demand for terminals
rapidly out-paced supply. The supply system responded in
exemplary fashion, but could not keep up with the insatiable
demand for access to the network. (Hall, 1991)
The communications links providing connectivity
began with hardwire and developed into satellite and microwave
applications. Ground Mobile Forces (GMF) networks using
Satellite Communications Terminals, AN/TSC-85 and AN/TSC-93,
linked units with the widest separation, while AN/GRC-201 and
AN/TRC-170 Microwave Radio Sets provided shorter range
multichannel links. Within headquarters, coaxial cable and
fiber optic cable were the primary links. (9th Comm Bn, 1991)
d. Links Out of Theater
One of the most useful features of the system was
the GMF satellite link between the Brigade Service Support
Group (BSSG) Headquarters at the Port of Jubayl and Fort
Buckner, Okinawa. Three 9.6 K bits/sec circuits were beamed
via an Indian Ocean satellite to the Defense Communications
System station at Fort Buckner. These three circuits allowed
all the system users in Southwest Asia to access the Marine
Corps Data Network through the Regional Automated Service
Center (RASC) on Okinawa. This made many information resources
at Marine Commands throughout the world available to LAN
users. It also provided AUTOVON trunking and AUTODIN message
service for the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) . This
roundabout routing capitalized on the processing power of the
RASC on Okinawa and avoided the heavy traffic on the Atlantic
Ocean circuits. (9th Comm Bn, 1991 and Brewin, 1991)
e. Maintenance
Using equipment not intended for field use in the
hot sandy desert environment of Saudi Arabia might well have
developed into a maintenance disaster. However, a variety of
ingenious methods were developed to keep the terminals cool
and clean. Servers were typically shrouded in damp
cheesecloth and burlap and serviced by a fan to reduce the
heat. Other equipment was protected with panty hose to
filter out the fine dust from the desert breeze. Operator
maintenance took on a new meaning as clerks cleaned computers
as often as their infantry brothers cleaned their rifles.
This extra effort paid off as most equipment continued to
operate throughout the campaign. (Levine, 1991)
f. Motivation for Use
A primary motivator to use the network was the
backlog on other communication systems. Between five and ten
thousand messages a day inundated the AUTODIN message center
at I MEF, which meant that getting out a routine or even
priority message was difficult. In addition, the capacity of
the military phone system was strained to the limit as staffs
who were accustomed to the extensive network in the U.S. were
confined to a fraction of that connectivity. Waiting long
periods for an available line and then finding the other end
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busy, or getting cut off in the middle of a conversation were
the frustrations expressed by several staff officers.
The data network lacked such problems. It handled
over one million messages a day, providing the paper-handling
capacity demanded by modern coordination-intensive staff
operations. In the hectic days preceding Desert Storm, most
users found it to be a tremendous time saver. By using the
network, they avoided the congestion on the phone system.
Also, each addressee on a network message received a copy of
the message on his terminal and could then print and
distribute the ones he desired. However, no prioritization
scheme was available and the network was limited to
classifications of secret and below. (Early, 1991, sect 9)
The use of LANs and WANs to augment, if not
replace, the AUTODIN message system
immeasurably aided in the prosecution of the
war. (Early, 1991, sect 9)
g. Training
Marine units arriving from West Coast commands
where LAN's had been used routinely in exercises before the
war were readily assimilated into the network as they arrived.
Units arriving from the East Coast were not as accustomed to
networking and required some coaching to become familiar with
the procedures and usefulness of the system. However, they
soon realized the necessity of the network and began building
11
their system, training their staff to use it, and overwhelming
I MEF with requests for additional terminals. (Hall, 1991)
Though the network had been used by I MEF units
before the war, it had not been tested under the volume of
traffic and operational conditions that it faced in Southwest
Asia. Because doctrine for using the data network had not yet
been developed, even technically competent users could not
make full use of the system. Table of Equipment (T/E) and
Table of Organization (T/0) support had not been established
so equipment and procedures to use it varied between units,
thus hindering interoperability. Many other would-be-users
found themselves untrained on this new information processing
tool and had to learn under pressure. Even with these
limitations, most users were enthusiastic about both its
performance and its potential. Fortunately, the system was
simple to comprehend and many without previous computer
experience became overnight experts on e-mail. (Early, 1991,
sect 9)
To get the system up and running in units where it
had not been widely used, both I MEF and 1st Division
organized teams of LAN trainers. The most effective
instructional method, however, was one-on-one in front of a
terminal. The objective was to leave at least one person in
each staff section as a point of contact and as the limited
local expert to trouble-shoot basic problems before calling
the system managers in the G-6. Most new users of the system
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were motivated by peers who were using the system and getting
more done as a result. (Imhof, 1991)
The system software was menu-driven allowing even
individuals with little computer familiarity to quickly fathom
the rudiments of sending electronic mail, which was the
primary use of the system. In some staff sections, the staff
officers themselves manned the keyboard to conduct personal
liaison with other officers. In other sections, the clerks
keyed in hand-written memos, AUTODIN messages excerpts, or
verbal instructions passed from staff officers fully occupied
on radio nets or in other planning requirements. (Imhof,
1991)
3. Final Setup
The final network configuration included all major
Marine commands in Southwest Asia. In almost all cases, both
primary and alternate connectivity was provided. It was
comprised of approximately 40 servers, 750-800 devices, and
thousands of users. Most links were over cable or microwave.
Several high priority links were maintained over satellite.
Figure 2-1 shows the configuration at the peak of usage,
before the retrograde began. (Cheatam, 1991)
It is significant to note that the network included no
other service. I MEF liaison officers with CENTCOM and with
certain Army units operated dial-in nodes on the MEF network.
CENTCOM established a separate network classified at the SCI
13
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level that was used by the I MEF G-2 . That was the limit of
interoperability. (Hall, 1991)
B. HOW THE NETWORK WAS USED
While Banyan Vines has substantial capability, its primary
use in I MEF during the war was electronic mail. It
frequently became a substitute for phone conversations between
staff officers. Rather than talking on the phone to a staff
officer at another command, a I MEF action officer would sit
at a keyboard and compose an e-mail message. In staff
sections, such as the G-2 where large amounts of information
were entered into the net, a clerk at the keyboard responded
to the guidance of an officer engaged in generating the input
to the network. Sometimes e-mail messages were used for
historical reporting such as with daily status reports. On
other occasions it was used as a real time alternate to the
primary tactical nets. (Steed, 1991)
1. Logistical Use
Several staff sections used the LAN extensively for
internal section coordination. For instance, the G-4 at the
MEF ran a geographically split section, about 25 per cent with
the section head in the forward command post, and the
remainder in the main command post. This required extensive
daily communication on the network to coordinate the
tremendous logistics effort necessary to support the MEF.
Logistics summaries and dump status reports were transmitted
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over the net daily for review by the section head and then
compiled for submission to CENTCOM. External logistic agency
reports were also handled in this manner whenever possible.
Resupply matters to CONUS were frequently passed over the
network, making the link through Okinawa particularly useful.
Vehicle accident reports, resupply requests, transportation
requests, and guidance to subsections were all routinely
communicated over the local or wide area nets. (List, 1991)
The networks probably enjoyed their highest usage rate
in the area of logistics. The personnel who were the most
familiar with computer nets, and the type of information that
was best suited for networking were both resident in the
logistics section. It was estimated that 90 per cent of the
G-4's critical business went over the network making it a
vital tool in the prosecution of the war. (List, 1991)
The Marine LAN was essential to the operation
of the vast supply network managed by the 2nd
FSSG. We could not have survived logistically
without it. (Krulak as quoted by Brewin, 1991)
2. Intelligence Uses
Because the CENTCOM intelligence network was
classified above secret at the SCI level and therefore
couldn't be linked to the MEF network, only limited
information flowed into the MEF G-2 on the MEF network.
Instead many items from AUTODIN and other sources had to be
16
inserted on the LAN at the MEF level for distribution to
subordinate commands. The Division level G-2 consequently-
received a large volume of incoming traffic on the network
from both the MEF and the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. (Peterson,
1991)
In fact, it was estimated by the 1st Marine Division
G-2A that 80 per cent of the incoming intelligence information
to the division came across the network. Lengthy intelligence
updates from I MEF would have been delayed significantly if
sent through the AUTODIN system or by voice. Pilot
observations from recently flown missions over the battlefield
were received by the Division G-2 over the network and relayed
immediately to the combat forces in contact. Other means of
reporting and acting on this timely information would simply
not have gained similar results. (Peterson, 1991)
Some incoming information was of a nature that it
could be sorted immediately and passed to the G-3 and G-4
.
Most of the outgoing information was also passed to the G-3
and G-4 as information copies on the net. The network was
also a convenient means to route targeting data from the G-2
to the G-3. Most of this traffic was keyed in by a clerk
under the supervision of a staff officer. (Peterson, 1991)
3. Administration Uses
The G-l found the network to be a useful tool in many
ways, but it also created some new responsibilities for him.
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Message preparation, personnel reports, and staff coordination
were all made easier by the network, but message distribution
became an additional burden. The G-l was split between
command posts making the network a convenient coordination
tool. However, it also created a message sorting and
distribution problem as the incoming AUTODIN traffic was
passed to the forward command post via the network. Then,
daily, the 300-500 messages received had to be reviewed and
distributed by the primary staff officer, a liability for him,
but a great service to the rest of the staff. (Franke, 1991)
A potentially invaluable network use was fortunately
never fully tested. A liaison officer was established at the
field hospital with a network node and the addresses of all
major commands. When a casualty arrived, his identity and
status was immediately reported back to his command to prompt
personnel replacements as necessary and commence casualty
reporting procedures. If the number of casualties anticipated
before the war had occurred, this would have been a critically
important tool. (Hall, 1991)
4. Operations Uses
Within the operations section, the network was
routinely used as a substitute for both AUTODIN and voice
traffic to transmit frag orders, sitreps, and air requests.
Every network message coming into the combat operations center
was treated as official traffic to preclude any lost
18
information. The improved message responsiveness of the
network reduced the number of staff officers and couriers
travelling between the widely dispersed desert command posts.
E-mail procedures were not difficult to learn or incorporate
into operation center routine and undoubtedly increased the
speed of the command and control process. A valuable tool was
its ability to create a record of coordination otherwise
conducted over a phone with little record kept. (Steed, 1991)
The most significant network use in the entire war was
without doubt the transmission of the Air Tasking Order (ATO)
.
Timely delivery of the ATO was critically important to the
conduct of the war, but its size created a challenging
problem. Originally the 500-700 page ATO was passed via
AUTODIN message as a flash precedence message that occupied
six to eight hours of transmission time simply to reach the
main subordinate commands under CENTCOM. This meant that
further dissemination to air crews and controllers and to the
forces they supported, could take far too long for proper
coordination and execution. Once the network was employed to
send the ATO, hundreds of pages were reduced to those sections
relevant to I MEF, and were then transmitted to Marine
squadrons and controllers using a small fraction of the time
previously required. Distribution of the Air Tasking Order
was an outstanding example of the effectiveness of the LAN.
This single capability made a clear difference in the way the
war was fought. (Early, 1991, sect 9)
19
C. ADVANTAGES
Many Marines commented on the usefulness of the network
during the war. The advantages can be summarized as follows:
1. Conservation of Assets
Because only the messages needed by each staff section
were printed, much less paper and copy support was required.
The congestion on many phone nets was reduced saving time and
conserving available phone time for necessary voice
communication
.
This applied to AUTODIN as well. It would be
impossible to quantify how much the network relieved the
AUTODIN message system, but clearly, considering only the ATO,
six to eight hours a day were saved. By allowing better
anticipation of requirements, the network helped make more
efficient use of many other resources. The faster flow of
information improved the efficiency of the force as a whole.
2. Time Saved
The amount of time saved by using the network also
would be difficult to estimate, but almost everyone agreed
that it saved time on the phone, time just trying to reach
someone on a phone or voice radio net, time in meetings, and
time waiting in a queue to see the section head. When face-
to-face contact was necessary, the section head was less
likely to be on the phone or busy with someone else. In the
20
hectic days preceding the war, efficiency was an important
commodity.
3. Professionalism
There are some who believed that the network improved
the professionalism of staff work. Phone conversations often
wander and miss their objective and ill-conceived ideas are
easier to propose verbally than in writing. Messages sent via
the network however, were generally better organized and
ultimately more valuable than phone conversations. In
addition there was a hard copy record of the information
transmitted.
D. FRUSTRATIONS
While the I MEF data network was a tremendous tool during
the war, it did have some significant weaknesses.
1. Isolation
First, it was isolated to some extent both vertically
and horizontally. Vertically, intelligence could not flow
either to or from CENTCOM on the network. Such isolation from
the next senior command was a serious limitation. Because of
the rapid pace of the war, maneuver units reported only
limited information up the chain of command. This forced the
bulk of intelligence into I MEF to come from CENTCOM. The
effort required to sort and insert it into the network was
highly inefficient. Some isolation also existed below the
division level since none of the maneuver elements had a
21
networking capability. While there is no doctrine currently on
how low in the organizational chain the network should extend,
providing the capability to one step below the division
received some support. (Lachowicz, 1991)
Horizontal isolation was not a problem within the
Marine Corps, but it was between adjacent inter-service
organizations. Only by providing liaison teams with
networking capability could the MEF transfer data with other
service organizations.
2. Classification
Another problem was the level of classification.
Before leaving CONUS, the network was limited to unclassified
traffic. Once in Southwest Asia, various means were used to
raise the level of classification to secret. For most uses
this was adequate, but some intelligence traffic was above
this level and had to be transmitted by other means.
All the links within theater operated at the secret
level while those on the wide area network outside the theater
continued to operate unclassified. When the link to the
Marine Corps Data Network was established, careful addressing
was required to ensure no classified messages left the theater
of operations.
3. Prioritization
There was no way to prioritize messages. The system
worked on the first in, first out principle. During light
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usage that was not a problem since messages were transmitted
when they were received. However, during periods of high
usage in SWA the system became overloaded and high priority
messages were held up in the queue with lower priority
traffic.
4. Capacity
The message delay problem was related to the capacity
of the system, which was of concern as well. Since the high
volume of traffic across the net was unexpected, on several
occasions the system became overloaded and crashed simply
because server disk space was exceeded. This unfortunate
result, though quickly remedied, caused some Marines to
question the reliability of the system.
5. Distribution
Another problem involved message distribution. Each
incoming message had to be screened, sorted, and distributed,
all which was time consuming for the staff officer concerned.
The volume of traffic was totally unexpected. The divisions
were receiving 300-500 messages a day, each of which had to be
individually read and evaluated.
6. Authority of Messages
The authority of network messages became an issue.
While most Marines viewed a message as an alternative to a
phone call with about the same level of authority, others
chose to treat it like an AUTODIN message to preclude lost
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information. While that was a prudent choice for such a
situation, the source of network messages was somewhat less
official than the typical AUTODIN message.
7. Support Required
The network has been criticized for increasing certain
requirements such as embark space, training, maintenance,
command post support, etc., without replacing any other piece
of equipment or personnel. In a busy environment, the
addition of tasks without the subtraction of others does not
go unnoticed.
8. Addressing
Finally, there was some confusion about the proper
address of individuals on the network. Different conventions
were used in each organization and some individuals were not
aware of established standards within their command. This led
to undelivered and mis-routed messages because delivery
required exact addresses.
E. OPERATIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS
While the network was most frequently used for reporting
past events and coordinating plans for future operations,
there were some occasions when the network provided real-time
support for Marines in contact with hostile forces. The MEF
G-3 stated that during the ground campaign, while the forward
thrust of the divisions was occupying everyone's attention,
enemy prisoners of war became a growing concern. The first
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news that massive numbers of prisoners were stopping the
tactical flow came over the network. Subsequently,
coordination was effected over the network to get
transportation and personnel to move and process the
prisoners. (Steed, 1991)
The 1st Division G-2 recalled that the most reliable and
accurate intelligence reports he received came across the
network from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. Every night just
before dark, a Marine fighter aircraft was tasked to fly along
the forward edge of the enemy positions low enough to observe
unit locations and activity. When he landed he was debriefed
and his report was transmitted via the network to the G-2.
These "last light fighter" observations, often relayed
directly to maneuver units, were typical of the timely
intelligence information made available by the network.
(Peterson, 1991)
A reconnaissance unit scheduled for a mission within 24
hours submitted an urgent request for several sets of elbow
and knee pads to the 1st Marine Division G-4 . From the
forward command post, filling that request seemed unlikely.
However, the network allowed the request to be worked almost
immediately in the main command post, and within the allotted
time, the required items were in the hands of the Marines.
(Spenser, 1991)
Just before the ground campaign began, the 1st Marine
Division conducted a combined arms raid with an artillery
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battery firing at suspected enemy positions. Fighter aircraft
were in support to attack enemy forces reacting to the
artillery fires. As the attack progressed, the enemy response
dictated the need for electronic jamming support. The
division air officer quickly relayed the request to 3d MAW on
the network in the chat mode and obtained the required support
in time to complete the mission. (Hofley, 1991)
These are just a few examples of the real-time
effectiveness of the network operating in the crisis. They
clearly demonstrate the network's capability to provide
effective operational connectivity.
F. CONCLUSION
The rapid development of procedures and the adapting of
existing equipment to meet the needs of the mission in the
Persian Gulf War present another stirring chapter in Marine
Corps history. These Marines implemented a command and
control system that provides the rudiments of what Marine
Corps doctrine requires. In OH-2 The MAGTF . effective command
and control is defined in terms of force effectiveness as
"whether the force functions more effectively and quickly than
the enemy." Clearly in the Persian Gulf War that goal was
accomplished. The firepower advantage of the Coalition forces
probably would have carried the day even without the command
automation described above. However, it is readily apparent
that without battlefield command automation, the war would
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have been much less efficient, requiring more time, material,
and manpower.
Hidden within the success stories of command automation
are some lessons learned about information flow. These require
correction to ensure that we can continue to function inside
a future enemy's observation-orientation-decision-action loop.
Appendix C lists some information flow requirements that
remain to be met by our current command and control
architecture. So, where do we go from here to satisfy these
additional requirements while continuing to meet the force
effectiveness test with our C2 system?
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III. LAN EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
A. WHY DO HE NEED A LAN?
Before developing this new technology any further, it is
prudent to ask some basic questions about what should be done
to best use the LAN. Simply because it was successful in
certain situations in Southwest Asia does not mean that it is
the best solution to all command and control problems. Even
if there is a worthwhile application in certain areas, there
must be a plan to employ it.
In Command In War , Van Creveld has asked two pertinent
questions concerning new technologies: "What is the effect of
the new devices on existing methods, and how can the devices
best be put to use?" He further suggests that an important
issue is determining what the proper burden sharing should be
between man and machines. That is, in which functions and to
what extent should the data network be applied and what
functions should remain the responsibility of a human or a
less technical system? It is true that a data network cannot
be instituted for all communications requirements at all
levels. Nevertheless, a stated Marine Corps C4 goal as
articulated by Brigadier General Breth is the ". . .exploitation
of state-of-the-art information technology...." (Breth,
1990) . Could the LAN be part of this exploitation?
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It is also important that the network not further
exacerbate the problem of the data explosion now overwhelming
certain command functions, but assist in gathering,
processing, and using the data in some constructive manner.
If, as charged by some, the network adds complexity and bulk
to the command system without shouldering a commensurate share
of the functional tasks, then it is only an end in itself and
is a liability instead of a capability. (Van Creveld, 1985,
pp. 2-3)
B. FUNCTIONS REQUIRED
OH 6-1A, Ground Combat Element Command and Control, lists
a good set of command functions that the network might
fulfill. If the data network is to continue its trend toward
improving command and control, it must satisfy these functions
well enough to be perceived as an asset. The four basic
functions are as follows:
• Provide the commander accurate, timely information and
ideas for developing feasible courses of action and making
logical decisions.
• Translate the commander's decisions into plans and orders.
• Communicate those plans and orders to subordinates.
• Supervise the execution of those plans and orders.
To analyze what role a data network may play in each of
these functions requires that the following questions be
answered: how can the system be employed in performing that
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function and does the network provide a clear advantage over
current systems? Implicit in these questions are the issues
of survivability, reliability, and flexibility. While the
answers to these questions are theoretical at this point, they
provide a framework for discussing command and control
functionality in the years ahead.
C. ELECTRONIC MAIL DESCRIPTION
Before examining how the system might be employed to
fulfill the command functions, it is necessary to understand
what the system can do in a little more detail. The basic
function of a data network is electronic mail (e-mail) . While
that may appear to reduce it to little more than a
communication tool, e-mail has some unique capabilities that
make it more than just a messaging system.
1. Definition
To see how e-mail can be an important tool in a
command and control system, consider a proposed definition:
"Electronic mail is the store-and-forward transport of
electronic objects, across a heterogeneous environment, among
people, among people and applications, and among
applications." (Soft Switch, 1989, p. vii) The definition
can be broken down and analyzed as follows:
2 . Store-and-Forward Transport
Figure 3-1 shows the basic structure of all e-mail









a server and the server is connected to other servers over the
network. The users can submit mail to the server, where it is
stored for future delivery, either to other users' terminals
connected to that server, or to other servers. The servers
interact to deliver e-mail from one user to another across the
network within a building, or around the world as required.
Whereas real-time data communications simply transmit a file
when directed to do so, an e-mail system can store messages
and other digital objects to be delivered at some future time,
when the receiver is available, for instance, or when another
condition is met. This was a critical feature to the Marine
Corps network use in Southwest Asia. (Miley, 1991)
One of the Banyan Vines strengths was that it
supported Marine units as they moved from
position to position on the battlefield.
That's absolutely critical to our operation
because we displace so much. We have units
with servers moving all the time. When you
disconnect a Banyan server and move all the
users identified with that server, the
remaining network continues to collect mail
for those users. As soon as the server is
reconnected, the mail starts flowing again.
(Hall as quoted by Olsen, 1991)
The server, then, can be thought of as the store-and-
forward transport mechanism, and the user's terminal is a
message center that can automatically process the data it
receives. To automatically process data in a specific manner,
the user may require specialized software besides e-mail.
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This software is readily available and has received positive
endorsements from data processing professionals. (Beyond
Incorporated, 1991 and Ayre, 1991 and Needleman, 1991)
3. Electronic Objects
Electronic objects in the definition refer not only to
text, but also to any other digital information such as
images, voice, or numerical data. While the current C2
challenge is primarily processing text, fulfilling command
functions may eventually require not only transporting these
types of data, but integrating them as well into mixed media
objects. (Miley, 1991)
4. People and Applications
People-to-people connectivity is simply passing
messages between two or more individuals as well as using the
system to transfer forms, reports, documents, or entire files
to another individual. People-to-applications connectivity
occurs when a rule based software program is inserted that
allows the user to tell the application what information to
acquire and under what conditions. An illustration might be
an established daily requirement to post to a table the
sunrise/sunset times taken from a database. The information
to be acquired is the sunrise/sunset time and the condition is
the specified time of day to retrieve it. Finally,
application-to-application connectivity exists when one
program, executing a previously directed instruction, queries
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another program for data to complete a specific task. For
example, the G-2 might initiate a request via the G-2 terminal
for enemy order of battle data not maintained in the local
command. The G-2 terminal automatically queries other command
databases for the required information and then updates the
missing information in the G-2 status table.
Figure 3-2 shows the types of connectivity just
discussed as they apply to a range of objects to be
transmitted. On the vertical scale is shown the various
connectivity combinations of people and applications, while
the horizontal scale shows the different information types to
be transmitted. The simplest communication is an e-mail text
message in the upper left corner, while the most complex
communication is files transmission between two applications
in the lower right corner. With this range of communication
capabilities in mind, the network ability to fulfill the
command functions can be examined by associating them with an
appropriate enabling connectivity. (Miley, 1991)
D. FULFILLING C2 FUNCTIONS WITH A LAN
While three of the four command functions involve
information flow, clearly the first is the most complex and
the basis for effectively accomplishing the other three.
1. Provide the Commander Accurate and Timely Information
and Ideas for Developing Feasible Courses of Action


































The acquisition capability of a data network is
commonly understood because that is a communication function
that communication tools have been fulfilling for centuries.
The network used in Southwest Asia proved that it had some
significant capability in this area to complement the more
traditional forms of communication. However, providing
information and ideas to the commander is more than simply
obtaining data. It includes processing the data to make it
useful. Therefore the key test for the network is not only to
acquire data, but to focus information and ideas to be useful
in decision-making.
a. Focusing Information
The major challenge for any commander, and
therefore for the command system that he directs, is to make
some useful sense of all the information that is available to
him. From a historical perspective Van Creveld remarks,
As the quantity of data rose, the difficulty
of interpreting it in preparation for
decision-making grew, causing staff to be
piled upon staff and computer upon computer.
New techniques, from operations research and
systems analysis to cybernetics and games
theory, were developed in order to cope with
the flood of data. (Van Creveld, 1985, p. 3)
Modern technology has obliged to provide commanders with a
plethora of raw data that may or may not have any significance
to the commander's immediate situation. Even more to the
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point, only a limited amount of the available and possibly
pertinent information can be acquired and processed in a
timely manner. Consequently, the command system must focus
it's information gathering and processing efforts on the
commander's critical information requirements, which are
"those items he considers critical to success on the
battlefield." (OH 6-1A, 1988, p. 3-1)
(1) Critical Information Requirements. While
every situation will have its own peculiar requirements, some
information has been identified as critical in most tactical
situations such as intelligence information concerning the
enemy, environmental information concerning the terrain and
weather, and astronomical data. See Appendix D for a more
complete list of critical information requirements. Also of
obvious importance is friendly force information such as
current strength, location, activity, and weapons,
communications, and logistics capabilities.
Each of the above categories represents only
a general classification. Within each category are numerous
groupings representing individual unit descriptions,
capabilities, equipment, and status, in every area of military
science. What should be obvious is that even carefully
organizing both information acquisition and processing can be
an overwhelming chore. Any tool that could effectively
classify this information would be indispensable. If it is to
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be substantially useful in the C2 business, the LAN must
demonstrate the capability to do this.
(2) Sources. The source of this data is varied,
including friendly force personnel, operational, and
logistical status reports, all-source intelligence,
encyclopedic databases, and staff analysis. Geographically
speaking, the source of this information is potentially
worldwide since intelligence gathering systems are often
space-based and constructive analysis may be provided half a
world away by a subject-matter expert. Here, the global reach
of the data network is at its best, making accessible to the
commander input from these sources from almost any spot on the
globe with a linked terminal. This creates a virtual command
center of almost limitless resources. These sources could
come via any of the forms of connectivity shown in Figure 3-2.
(3) Sorting. To properly focus the mass of
information reaching the command center requires that the
identified critical information requirements be used to sort
incoming messages into logical files for rapid analysis. This
can be accomplished on the network using message-based rules
suggested in paragraph C.4 above. To collect the desired
information, the critical requirements must be expressed in
terms of rules using key words, events, locations, or time,
for instance. All incoming messages matching the given
conditions will then be sorted as the message-based rules
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direct. This information may be further processed to glean
the exact intelligence needed and to update databases or any
other report or display format. Either the person-to-
application connectivity or the application-to-application
connectivity is the system capability from Figure 3-2 in use
here.
(4) Integration. Part of focusing information
includes combining related information to provide a clear
picture of the battlefield. This can be tailored to suit each
commander's style and each situation, but it must continue the
process of refining the volume of incoming data, not simply
receiving and cataloging it. By continuing the rule set use
on the system, sorted intelligence data can be integrated into
files or formats that suit each situation and command style.
A key enabling factor in this sorting is standard format
intelligence reports. (Beyond Mail, pp. 10-12)
(5) Display. Once it is received, sorted, and
integrated, the information must be displayed in a usable
format for the commander to comprehend easily and act upon.
An adequate display can be provided with a standard terminal
monitor using readily available software to present charts,
tables, and graphs. If deemed necessary, more sophisticated
displays are possible, but they may require more complex
hardware than currently available to the Fleet Marine Force.
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(6) Update. The last focusing task is
automatically updating critical requirements as new
information is received in the command center. This is a
classic application-to-application connectivity from Figure 3-
2. Whether the incoming information comes as text, documents,
or files, software acting in conjunction with e-mail
continuously updates all the identified critical requirements
and revises display elements.
(7) Executive Information System. What has been
described above is essentially an executive information system
(EIS) . In the business world it is described as follows:
EIS is a computer-based system that serves the
information needs of top executives. It
provides rapid access to timely information
and direct access to management reports. It
is very user-friendly, supported by graphics,
and provides exceptions' reporting and "drill
down" capabilities. It is also easily
connected with on line information services
and electronic mail. (Turban, 1990, p. 366)
This type of system is in use by successful leaders in
business and industry as indicated by a study by the Center
for Information Systems Research at MIT, which found that in
1989 over 50 per cent of large U.S. corporations had EIS
programs installed or underway. (Turban, 1990, p. 366)
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b. Focusing Ideas
Ideas and information have been separated here
because although collecting both is similar, the focusing of
ideas and information is accomplished differently by the
network and therefore needs to be considered independently.
(1) Idea Development. Despite the tremendous
progress made in recent years in computer technology,
computers cannot replace the creativity of the human mind.
Some technologies discussed below show some promise of
eventually contributing to military decision-making, but the
art of generalship is at this point still the domain of the
human mind.
(2) Expert Systems. Tools referred to as expert
systems (ES) are in use in a variety of business applications.
"Typically, an expert system is a decision-making and/or
problem-solving package of computer hardware and software that
can reach a level of performance comparable to—or even
exceeding that of—a human expert in some specialized and
usually narrow problem area." (Turban, 1990, pp. 14) The ES
has stored in its memory the task-specific knowledge of some
human expert. Then, someone who needs the advice of the human
expert can instead ask the computer specific questions and
receive answers based on the stored information. The computer
can provide conclusions and some limited inferences and even
explain the logic on which the conclusion was based. While
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there may be some applications for an ES in the more
technically oriented aspects of military planning, it is no
substitute for the bold imagination of the commander designing
a campaign plan. In addition, an ES is a completely separate
technology from a data network.
(3) Neural networks . At the forefront of computer
software technology are neural networks. Designed to mimic
the human brain, they are not programmed, but are trained by
repeated exposure to similar problems and solutions. The
network eventually determines what factors are important in
reaching certain conclusions and can then solve similar
problems by pattern analysis. Like ES, neural networks may
eventually have an application in military science, but for
the present, they cannot develop ideas for the commander
perhaps because of inadequate training material to train the
network neurons.
(4) Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS) .
Another potentially useful software in idea development is
known as a group decision support system. This software is
defined as "...an interactive, computer-based system that
facilitates the solution of unstructured problems by a set of
decision makers working together as a group" (Turban, 1990, p.
132) . For example, a group of primary staff officers might
gather in a room with linked terminals and a common display
screen to brainstorm courses of action. They would have
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similar information available to them as described above under
focusing information. The commander might control the session
by asking for ideas on specific issues or proposing
alternatives. This arrangement is purported to improve both
efficiency and effectiveness, particularly in large groups.
It is most effective in tasks that involve generating ideas
and solving problems without optimal solutions. (Turban,
1990, p. 139)
While this concept seems to have more
potential for success in a military command system than the
previous two, it has not had widespread success where it has
been implemented in civilian organizations. Still, the
concept is not well developed and has had only limited use, so
perhaps the theoretical benefits may still be realized.
(Kraemer and King, 1988, p. 140)
(5) Data Networks and GDSS
.
The three
technologies just discussed are not integral elements of the
typical data network and are not, at this point in their
evolution, of great use in idea development. However, this
type of exchange of ideas has already taken place on the data
network
.
Recently when tasked by the Commandant of the
Marine Corps to produce a plan for the future of the Marine
Corps, Brigadier General Krulak used the Marine Network to
develop the plan, USMC 2001, with the help of other general
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officers not geographically present. "We built a file of all
the (LAN) ID numbers of all the Marine generals and engaged in
a great deal of give and take over the LAN." (Krulak as
quoted by Brewin, 1991) This is a typical example of concept
development on the network. It is not a substitute for face-
to-face discussions in many instances where tone, emphasis,
and personality are important. Nevertheless, it is a valuable
tool to provide information that otherwise would be
unreachable or untimely.
2. Translate the Commander's Decisions Into Plans and
Orders
This command function requires the staff to develop
the decision into a well-supported, carefully coordinated set
of instructions. These instructions, in the form of a plan or
an order, cannot hope to eliminate uncertainty nor should they
deprive subordinate commanders the latitude of their
initiative. Nevertheless, these instructions must focus the
available intelligence, relate all aspects of available
support to the operation, and provide coherent guidance about
the commander's intent. An expertly meshed staff process is
demanded.
a. Staff Interaction
The lack of readily decomposable staff functions
dictates a parallel staff process be pursued for coherent
instructions to be produced. Several data network




Developing forms for off-the-shelf operation plans
and frag orders can speed up the order issuing process
considerably. Routing software on the network can merge data
from each section onto appropriate forms as the forms travel
from one terminal to another. This could be especially useful
for standard supporting requests such as logistics and
supporting arms. Referring to Figure 3-2, this is an example
of person-to-person connectivity transferring documents.
Another staffing technique might have the frag
order developed concurrently by separate sections while the
whole document appears in its entirety on all terminals. The
completed version could then be routed to the commander or
chief of staff for final review and issue. This form of
electronic brainstorming has been found to increase creativity
and help generate alternate courses of action. It requires
more than standard e-mail capability, but is readily available
in software. (Turban, 1990, p. 137)
c. Information Requirements
The staff also will have critical information
requirements. These requirements can be met by the network
using the same rule-based scheme described for sorting the
commander's traffic. Each staff section can sort traffic
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using its own rules, establishing files of information to
facilitate reporting and plan development.
In addition, distributed data bases may be
employed where each section and supporting agency maintains
its own information in a data base readily accessible to
anyone needing it. Just as with the commander's information,
information from around the world is available to the staff in
the virtual command center encompassing every known expert on
an issue as well as every available historical file. This is
not inundating confusing data, but carefully cataloged,
available only when queried. In Figure 3-2, the connectivity
is primarily person-to-application. This concept supports
survivability by spreading out critical information in several
different locations and on several different terminals.
3. Communicate Plans and Orders to Subordinates
Communicating messages and files is the forte of e-
mail where the traffic is sent immediately to numerous
addressees. Its receipt can be acknowledged automatically
without action by the addressees by viewing the message on
their terminal. At the subordinate command, it can be readily
routed to necessary staff sections, printed where appropriate
for study, and copied in part for forwarding.
4. Supervise the Execution of Plans and Orders
The extent and type of supervision is the commander's
prerogative. Hopefully he does not use an improved
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information processing tool such as the network to micromanage
subordinates. Used properly, the network can be employed to
monitor critical situations effectively without interference,
allowing the higher headquarters to provide timely support
even before it is requested. With the confidence that the
subordinate commander is seeing the same intelligence items
that he is seeing, the senior commander may be better able to
limit his guidance to his intent and his focus of effort.
E. REPORTING
Much of the basis for the information flow discussed above
is effective reporting.
A significant element in achieving the
objective of acquiring and focusing
information is the reporting system. An
effective reporting system should provide the
information the commander needs in a timely
manner without unduly burdening subordinate
units. (0H-6-1A, 1988, p. C-l)
Establishing effective rule-based message sorting,
developing useful databases, and therefore focusing
information and ideas at all levels is based on information
flow in standard formats to permit efficient sorting. This is
not a data network unique problem, however. The most
difficult type of decision-making for any commander occurs
when he is without his critical information requirements,
regardless of their transmission medium. The strength of the
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network is in efficiently processing and focusing a massive
amount of information flow. But the network cannot create the
flow. It can simply make it easier for a source of
information to get it to the commander.
Most commands have standard reporting procedures.
Fielding the Digital Communications Terminal has provided
excellent standard reports, which could form the basis for
standard unit reporting. OH 6-1A (Appendix C) offers a sample
reporting system that could also be emulated.
F. CONCLUSION
The evaluation questions at the beginning of this chapter
have been answered only qualitatively. But clearly this
technology demonstrates the potential for application in many
aspects of command and control. How much of the control
function it should absorb is not easy to say without
experimentation. It cannot substitute for face-to-face
contact or even voice contact in many crucial situations. The
right and wrong time to use it must be understood by all
users.
The network is not fully automated in that it requires a
significant amount of user input to keep the information flow
going. While that may be considered a weakness by some, it is
also a strength, because a return to simpler methods is very
easy when the network is unavailable for whatever reason.
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The network must not be considered as an end in itself,
but as a valuable technical tool to help manage the
information explosion that the age of technology has created.
Even as the radio made blitzkrieg possible, the data network
may make some equally dominating stratagem a reality.
It will take forward thinking and imagination to break
down the barriers of traditional organizational structure and
information flow to allow this new tool to be exploited.
Bonified criticism of its reliability, complexity, and
efficiency must be met with objective evaluation. The
ultimate goal, providing highly effective combat command and





In Command in War . Van Creveld states:
...the role that command may play in
determining the outcome of present-day
military conflict is crucial. By making
possible a faster, clearer reading of the
situation and a more effective distribution of
resources, a superior command system may serve
as a force multiplier and compensate for
weaknesses in other fields.... (Van Creveld,
1985, p. 4)
The challenge then is to use the LAN to its full capacity to
achieve the greatest force multiplication possible. All the
e-mail capabilities described in the preceding chapter are
available now, but are not being exploited. With over 700
servers around the Marine Corps linking all major commands,
the e-mail system is here to stay (Green, 1991) . The primary
obstacle to full employment of the LAN is how it is viewed by
individual Marines and consequently how they use it.
1. The Requirement
Before the war, as noted, a few commands at certain
levels were using the LAN experimentally. During the war, its
capability became vital in specific areas. Many who found the
LAN to be so useful in Southwest Asia had to learn how to use
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it in the middle of wartime preparations. Some were simply
too busy to take the time to learn and few used the system to
full capacity.
Future crises will no doubt require similar capability
stemming from the demand for increasing amounts of information
of all kinds. Appendix C lists sample information Marines
require for better command and control. "Not surprisingly,
information has been called the 'most vital of all combat
commodities' and the 'soul of morale in combat and the
balancing force in successful tactics." (Stares, 1991, p. 19)
2. Meeting the Requirement
The trend has been for staffs to grow and to be added
upon one another with ever-increasing amounts of hardware to
deal with the increasing demand for information. To manage
the information deluge in Desert Storm, the I MEF staff, which
before the war carried about 152 personnel, ballooned to about
1300 (MCLLS) . Since 1945, the number of personnel in staff
billets has grown fivefold and the amount of equipment to
service them has expanded similarly. (Van Creveld, 1985, p.
267)
The prospect in the immediate future for further
increasing staff size, or expanding the amount of equipment to
enhance command and control is questionable. In the years
ahead, personnel available to process information will no
doubt shrink in number, and funding available for new
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equipment will remain an uncertainty. However, threat
scenarios will continue to require rapid response. The
increasing capability of potential enemies and the decreasing
numbers of our own forces will present greater demands for
timely and accurate information.
To meet this demand, the LAN must be used to its
maximum capability. It may be well-suited to play the role of
C2 force multiplier. However, many Marines will need to
change the way they think about computers and automation in
general.
B. HOW DO WE GET THERE?
1. System Development
The basic steps in information system evolution have
been outlined by Lucas, Ginzberg, and Schultz as follows:
• Intervention: management recognizes a need for change in
the way information is processed or decisions are made and
activity to meet that need is initiated. e.g. The
development of an information system to meet the evolving
needs of Marine leaders.
• Implementation: information-processing or decision-making
behavior is changed from what it was before the
intervention.
• Improvement: successful implementation as improved
information processing or decision-making. (Lucas,
Ginzberg, and Schultz, 1990, p. 25)
In these terms, the LAN is a product of top level Marine
Corps leadership recognizing a need for a change in the way
information is processed in the Marine Corps. Intervention
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took place when the LAN was developed for use in command and
control. Implementation progressed slowly until the war
forced a change in behavior. The extent of implementation as
well as the improvement level may be assessed using simple
subjective measures.
2. Measures of Implementation
Measuring the change in how decisions are made is very
difficult. On the other hand, measuring acceptance and LAN use
is a more reasonable task, and these will be used as surrogate
measures in the following analysis.
Acceptance is indicated by the tendency to use the
LAN, while use is the actual level of system employment.
Acceptance is based on several factors leading to the decision
by an individual or an organization to use the system.
Acceptance should result in use, except where the system is
too difficult to employ extensively. (Lucas, Ginzberg,
Schultz, 1990, p. 25)
System effectiveness also will impact acceptance and
can be considered in two areas: performance and satisfaction.
Performance is the processed information's objective value,
while satisfaction is the user's subjective system evaluation.
These two are also closely related; generally, good
performance leads to high satisfaction. However, excellent
performance that was difficult to obtain might result in poor
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user satisfaction. Figure 4-1 shows the entire flow of the
process. (Lucas, Ginzberg, and Schultz, 1990, p. 26)
Figure 4.1 System Flow
Feedback loops show the element relationships
pertinent to the Marine Corps LAN. Successful LAN use in the
war resulted in increased acceptance. Satisfaction with the
LAN performance in the war caused both increased use and
acceptance. Figure 4-2 shows both the attained and the goal
level of these measures, as estimated by the author.
Figure 4.2 Implementation
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The estimates in Figure 4-2 apply to use during the
war by those who had access to the LAN. Satisfaction is rated
very high because almost everyone who used the system was
pleased with it. Performance is also marked high since users
generally felt that the processed information had a high
value. Acceptance is given a moderate score since many
Marines did not use the LAN because of unfamiliarity or
because they resisted computers in general. Finally, use is
rated relatively low because the LAN was not fully employed.
3. Decision to Use
LAN use may be mandated for certain reports or
documents, but if user acceptance is low, the system will
remain under-used. If the system is not mandated, the





These three work together to bring organizational goals and
the goals of the personnel involved into coincident focus.
(Lucas, Ginzberg, Schultz, 1990, pp. 39-43)
a. Leader Acceptance
This is perhaps the key factor in implementing the
system. If the unit leader believes in the LAN, he will sell
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its benefits in one fashion or another to his subordinates.
His belief in the system can be based on several factors.
First is his understanding of the system's
capabilities. If he has a thorough knowledge of how the LAN
can be used to accomplish his unit's mission, he is very
likely to encourage its use. If on the other hand, he has
only a limited understanding of its capability, he probably
will see it as a liability and not support implementation.
Another factor is the leader's assessment of
system support. Although he may understand the LAN's
potential, his perception of the available support may make
him cautious to employ it. For instance, if he believes its
reliability both in garrison and in the field is questionable,
he will wisely not rely too heavily on it for mission-critical
support
.
A leader's decision style also plays a part. For
instance, an intuitive leader generally has less use for an
information processing system than an analytic type leader.
Actually, the system's proper role of focusing information
should support both leadership styles. An intuitive leader
may find the system more useful if he avoids contacting it
directly by having someone else provide him with system
output
.
The leader's job characteristics are also a factor
in LAN acceptance. Some tasks such as tracking occurrences of
specified events are well-suited for the LAN. Other tasks
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such as selecting a course of action, or counselling a
subordinate may not be as appropriate. Some billets could
find extensive uses for the LAN, while others might find
little use at all. Understanding when to employ the system is
as important as knowing how to employ it.
The leader's demographics also may affect how he
perceives the LAN. Age, rank, education, previous tours and
experiences will all have an impact on how willing one is to
accept the LAN. Older and more senior Marines are generally
less receptive to the system because they lack exposure to it.
However, it is a widely held misconception that younger
Marines are more computer literate simply because they have
grown up in the computer age (Early, 1991, sect 9)
.
A final factor in system acceptance is the
commander's perception of the availability of organizational
support. Organizational support includes hardware and
software, repair parts, trained maintenance personnel, trained
operators and a command organization that has integrated the
system into operational procedures. Can he be convinced that
both hardware and software are available to make the LAN fully
functional? Can he confidently follow the dictum to "fight as
we train?" Can the system be deployed, be used in various
field environments, and still perform reliably? Are personnel
to maintain and operate it trained and available? And perhaps




User acceptance depends on the various factors
described for leaders as well as two additional
considerations. The first is system characteristics sometimes
called system friendliness . Although the system may be
supported by the unit leader and appeal to the user in all the
areas described above, it may still not find high user
acceptance. If the system is difficult to use, it probably
will not be frequently employed.
A second factor is the user's personal stake in
the system's success. His perception of the leader's
acceptance and support may motive him to make it work.
Additionally, the user's knowledge of the system's purpose can
affect how much enthusiasm he has for it. How much time does
it save and how important is the task that it accomplishes?
Finally, the user's view of organizational changes
that will result from the system implementation may raise some
questions. For instance, will the administrative section
absorb some communication section duties when the LAN is
installed? If so, the user's opinion of the system's
usefulness could be biased depending on his particular section
assignment.
c. Problem Urgency
A final factor that may spur both leader and user
system acceptance is problem urgency. If both groups perceive
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that they are overwhelmed with information, or as in Southwest
Asia, other systems prove inadequate, approval of a new system
could come rapidly. Once the LAN was used in SWA, its
excellent performance in handling problems caused its
reputation to spread, resulting in even more users finding it
to be useful.
4. Implementation Strategy
Successful implementation is based on the factors just
discussed and may be pursued in three general phases (Lucas,
Ginzberg, Schultz, 1990, p. 93)
.
a. Gain Commitment of User Leadership
Involve leaders as well as users in the
implementation process. By helping to create the system, they
learn about its advantages and accept it more readily. A
leader must be committed enough to provide resources for the
LAN and demand results from it. If a leader uses the LAN
himself, particularly to contact subordinates, the
subordinates soon find that the relationship with the leader
works better if both use it (List, 1991)
.
b. Seek Out Potential High Stake Users
Anyone who has a potentially significant use for
the LAN should be a target for early employment efforts.
Primary staff officers and supervisors of tasks ideally suited
for the LAN must be convinced that the system can improve
their product and save them time.
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c. Concentrate on the User's Stake in the System
Once the system is perceived as mandatory, user
acceptance is of less concern for full system employment. The
user should be encouraged to view the system as vital to his
command's function and important to how his leader perceives
his job performance. Then he will find new uses for the LAN,
teach his peers how to use it, and make it an indispensable
tool for command and control.
C. DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED
1. Doctrine
The Marine Corps should develop doctrine for the
proper and effective installation and use of the LAN. Before
the war, several commands experimented with LAN employment,
and during the war, many ingenious uses were discovered.
However, its capabilities need to be skillfully worked into
the Marine Corps command and control structure.
The lack of doctrine on installation and
utilization of LAN's and WAN's has led to a
number of difficulties that were only overcome
by unnecessary additional effort. We now
depend upon them on the battlefield, but we
aren't familiar enough with them to make full
use of their capabilities. (Early, 1991, sect
9)
The LAN can be applied to inappropriate tasks as well
as ineffectively employed on worthy assignments. The
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following doctrinal issues should be addressed to ensure
proper LAN employment:
• which nets can be eliminated by using the LAN?
• how low organizationally can the LAN be used?
• what should the table of equipment be to support the LAN?
• what standard procedures will be used on the LAN?
• which personnel will employ the LAN in different
applications?
The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps and the
special requirements of the combat arms make the above
questions particularly difficult to answer. Certainly,
communication links and procedures suitable for fixed based
forces will not be acceptable in their entirety for a Marine
Air Ground Task Force conducting an amphibious assault on a
hostile shore. Yet, for some purposes and at certain times,
the LAN may prove invaluable to the sometimes complicated
command structure of the amphibious force.
2. Employment Concepts
Developing employment techniques is perhaps as
important as cataloging the doctrine for LAN usage. The
widespread unfamiliarity with computers and their potential
make this a particularly significant factor. Developing
techniques to employ all the capabilities discussed in the
preceding chapter, requires an understanding of how the system
works. The LAN is not simply a substitute for a radio or a
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typewriter. Its potential reaches far beyond that. To employ
it correctly demands skill in using the technology, the
understanding of Marine command and control requirements, and
imagination to bring the two together. Accomplishing this
calls for a focused effort by knowledgeable leaders.
3. Demonstration Facility
Just as the best tactics are developed in the field,
the best command and control doctrine and techniques are
developed in a functioning command post. The doctrinal
questions suggested above can best be answered by establishing
a realistic C2 testbed where procedures and equipment can be
evaluated and perfected. Such a facility would be ideal for
teaching command and control once the doctrine and techniques
have been developed. When discussing deficiencies in C2
during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Brigadier General P.K.
Van Riper suggested a similar requirement:
Construct a functioning facility at Quantico
that contains actual or surrogate
communications and electronic equipment
(radios, consoles, scopes, computers, etc.)
for a MEF, division, regiment, wing, and FSSG
command post. This would serve as a training
facility for students and FMF staffs and as a
concepts testing and evaluation facility for
MCRDAC. (Van Riper, 1991)
Such a facility would not only be very useful in training
currently assigned staff personnel and students, but also
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would prove useful in providing standard training for non-FMF
personnel who will fill battle roster billets to complete
wartime staffing requirements.
D . EDUCATION
Currently, the only instruction on LAN's within Marine
Corps schools is found in the Computer Schools and in the
Communications Schools. Both concentrate on network
construction. Neither Amphibious Warfare School nor Command
And Staff College include any instruction on LAN Employment.
(Boeke, 1991)
Clearly, if the LAN is to become integral to Marine Corps
command and control structure, instruction on its employment
needs to be present in all formal schools that teach command
and control. If a C2 training facility such as suggested by
Brigadier General Van Riper were constructed, the students in
all the formal schools at Quantico could participate in staff
exercises as part of their course studies.
E. IMPROVEMENTS TO NETWORK CAPABILITIES
While the network has some significant capabilities as




In SWA, the network handled traffic classified at the
secret level and below. In peacetime operations, it has
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carried no classified traffic at all. Some real-world traffic
must be routed differently, a limitation that prevents
fighting the way we train. In addition, any information
classified above the secret level cannot be accessed even in
wartime with the current capability. The LAN needs to provide
multi-level security to reach its potential in command and
control. This topic is under study by other agencies in the




For obvious reasons, it is important for the LAN to be
able to communicate with other defense department networks and
other Marine Corps data systems. In SWA, the Marine Corps was
unable to link the LAN to any other service because of
interoperability problems. An interface also must be
developed for the LAN and the Tactical Combat Operations (TCO)
system of the Marine Tactical Command and Control System
(MTACCS) . These systems, which will integrate several other
Marine Corps tactical automated systems, are currently under
development. (Weigand, 1991)
3. Authentication
As with any communication system, a method must exit
to identify intruders on the network. Passwords can be used
to prevent unauthorized equipment use in friendly
headquarters. However, when the LAN is linked by radio
networks, enemy intrusion is possible. Currently the LAN
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lacks capability to prevent imitative deception. This issue
is under study. (Weigand, 1991)
4. Remote Operation
Lower command levels may not have a need or the
capability to support LAN operations within themselves.
However, the incoming information flow from higher
headquarters and the requirement to pass data up the chain of
command would be better served if a remote station could be
established on the higher headquarters LAN. (Weigand, 1991)
These are all areas that are under various stages of
study or development for early resolution. Most are related
to problems being tackled by other services or by the
information technology industry.
F. COMMITMENT
To develop the doctrine for LAN use, to educate Marines
with that doctrine, to correct system limitations, and to
implement the LAN successfully require that Marines have an
open mind and commitment to C2 excellence. The Marines in
Desert Storm demonstrated that they had both and led the way
toward a new concept of command and control. Those who follow
them must build upon their efforts and find the right
combination of tools and applications to carry Marine Corps C2
into the 21st century.
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V. FUTURE COMMAND AND CONTROL
A. CHALLENGE
The purpose of this discussion of the Marine Corps LAN is
not to promote a particular product or even a particular
technology. The merits of any product and the usefulness of
any technology must be considered in the context of the
specific requirement. Those most familiar with the
requirement must determine the best application.
1. Maximizing Combat Potential
The objective is to maximize the combat potential of
a military force through efficient command and control.
Efficiency in this sense means using fewer operating assets
such as time, manpower, equipment, or supplies to accomplish
the mission. OH-2 The MAGTF divides this efficiency into two
parts, effectiveness and quickness. These two criteria may
then be used to measure command and control efficiency.
2. Effectiveness and Quickness
It is tempting to assign equal importance to these two
criteria, but in reality they have a partnership of unequal
proportions. The partnership is illustrated by a quotation
often attributed to General G.S. Patton, "A good plan
violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed
next week." (Patton, 1979, p. 354) The proper planning
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balance in any combat situation between the quality of the
plan and timeliness of the decision to execute the plan must
be determined by the commander. Information technology can
affect both the quality of the plan and the timeliness of the
decision.
3. Quality Plans
The plan quality may be enhanced by improved
information processing and activity coordination. In some
cases, such as high technology surveillance, the information
was not available in any form before the electronic age. In
other cases, the information, while available from sources
other than modern technology, could not be practically
obtained in time to be used. For instance, in centuries past
observation of enemy movements far behind the front lines of
battle, often could not be relayed to the friendly commander
in time to be worthwhile. Timeliness was the real issue.
4. Timely Decisions
FMFM 1 emphasizes the value of timely decision-making:
Whoever can make and implement his decisions
consistently faster gains a tremendous, often
decisive advantage. Decision making thus
becomes a time-competitive process, and
timeliness of decisions becomes essential to
generating tempo. Timely decisions demand
rapid thinking, with consideration limited to
essential factors. We should spare no effort
to accelerate our decision-making ability.
(FMFM 1, 1989, p. 69)
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The opportunity for a rapid decision is generated when the
commander quickly receives the information he needs to make a
decision. The relative value of speed in the process is
determined by comparison to the observation-orientation-
decision-action (OODA) cycle speed of the enemy. The objective
is to maintain consistently a shorter OODA cycle time than the
enemy does. This is why FMFM 1 directs no effort be spared to
accelerate that cycle.
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND SPEED
Current commercial information technology products are
emphasizing speed. Speed, sometimes called power, is the
driving factor in processor development, networking, and even
many application programs. These speed-enhancing products
provide industry executives the same competitive advantages in
the marketplace that the military commander's rapid decisions
provide on the battlefield. One term for this advantage in
the business community is just-in-time business . For military
commanders, this is similar to staying inside the enemy's OODA
loop. (Grove, 1991)
This analogous relationship may lead to improved military
command and control through commercial product applications in
the military. Military C2 has the opportunity to adapt for
battlefield use the same technologies that industry is
developing for commercial, competitive purposes. Not all
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these technologies are appropriate for military use, but many
have very direct applications in military operations.
Military professionals must examine commercial products
for applications within the military and then select and apply
the most useful items. The products with the most obvious
applications are often already being used in the fields of
administration and logistics where the parallel between
military and commercial functions is almost direct. The more
difficult parallels in the intelligence and operations fields
are not readily perceived and therefore not in widespread use.
The use of the Marine Corps LAN illustrates the
application of a commercial product to military purpose. The
most widespread LAN usage occurs in logistics and
administration. Some operational and intelligence uses were
suggested earlier as LAN Employment Opportunities. For Marine
Corps command and control to "accelerate our decision-making
ability," key leaders who know the operational decisions to be
made, must get involved in evaluating and developing military
information tools for the future. Those products will provide
the basis for doctrinal procedures to give a decided
battlefield C2 advantage much the way that radio and radar
drastically altered military C2 in World War II (Stares, pp.
28-38, 1991).
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C. SOME PROMISING TECHNOLOGIES
The following areas have potential for military
application in command and control. All are at least under
research, some are developed as prototype technologies.
1. Ubiquitous Computer
A ubiquitous computer is one that is omnipresent but
also in the background so that it does its job without being
noticed. The various electric motors of a typical automobile
are a good example of technology that has disappeared into the
background. The operator seldom thinks about activating the
wiper motor, or the heater fan motor, or the starter motor or
any of the other 2 or so motors in the car. Electricity has
become ubiquitous. People flip light, TV, and appliance
switches without a thought of the hundreds of volts flashing
through the walls. (Weiser, 1991)
Computers will someday become so common-place that
they will not be the focus of attention they are today. They
will be programmed to accomplish automatically routine things
like phone-call routing, updating data files, and providing
the working software tools an individual normally uses at
whatever remote terminal he operates. Paper size computer
screens with pen-like writers will recognize handwriting and
transmit information to a database or a large screen display.
They also will recognize voice inputs for certain functions.
Through handwriting and speech inputs, computers will be
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usable by those who can ' t type or by those who have never
before used a computer. No longer will computers be
approachable only in specialized jargon by trained operators.
People will use them the way they use electricity today; they
will use them constantly, but will cease to be aware of them.
(Weiser, 1991)
2. Universal Networks
The computer networks that exist today are analogous
to the thousands of winding dirt roads that made up the U.S.
highway system in the early 1900' s. Passing information on
networks both commercially and in DOD is as slow and difficult
as travelling cross-country 90 years ago. This situation is
changing, however, and with the ubiguitous computer will come
the universal network that will allow access to all manner of
information and services. Transmission of high-guality
pictures and videos integrated with voice and notations will
be the norm. Real-time information exchange will take place
over wireless nets. Instead of a web of slow and confusing
communication channels, an easily accessible superhighway
information system will emerge. (Dertouzos, 1991)
A current benefit of global networking is just-in-time
business that is made possible by computer-supported
collaboration (CSC) . CSC is eliminating the barriers of space
and time in working with shared information. Groups of
decision-makers, sharing all forms of data in real-time, may
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change the way organizations, not just individuals, work. In
the business community, it is being heralded as the most
important source of competitive advantage in the near future.
For the military, it also has the potential to change the way
organizations work. (Grove, 1991)
3. Decision Support
Computer Supported Collaboration has begun the trend
of computers providing decision support. Frequently, CSC
allows several people to problem-solve using the same
computerized picture from different terminals. Wireless
networks with remote terminals such as the digitized
chalkboard and high-performance laptop terminals are already
demonstrating effective C2 in the laboratory (Grove, 1991)
.
This long-distance coordination using computing tools is the
beginning stage of a group decision support system (GDSS)
GDSS's have not had much success in the past, perhaps because
they were ahead of their time. Past GDSS efforts encouraged
groups to change their normal relationships and work patterns
without providing them the proper tools. In fact, until
recently, computers have not changed the way individuals or
groups work, but only allowed them to work more quickly or
accurately. If, as forecast, CSC alters the way organizations




Another avenue to be explored is the employment of
expert systems, programmed with the knowledge of one or more
human experts, that can respond to both quantitative and
qualitative questions with advice and logic. Expert systems
may eventually lead to neural networks that can be trained
much the way a human brain is trained by repetitive
experiences, and may be used to solve problems too difficult
for the human brain to understand or problems not appropriate
for any other system. (Ma lone and Rockart, 1991)
D. SCENARIO 2 010
The most difficult task for most planners is to look
beyond the challenges of the present and immediate future to
focus on the demands of the distant future. Futuristic
enemies, weapons, and technologies can be very difficult to
forecast with any certainty, and basing detailed development
decisions on those forecasts would be unwise anyhow. However,
forecasts are useful to chart general trends and to provide a
scenario for examining alternate architectures. The further
from the present the forecast reaches, the more important
flexibility becomes in system capability. Even in the recent
war in SWA, flexibility was the most important characteristic
in C2 architecture (Starr, 1991)
.
Developing flexible information systems requires slipping
free from the burden of current strategies and hurdling mind-
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set roadblocks to explore the possibilities of future
technologies. It could be anywhere in the year 2 010.
1 . The Commander
The Brigade Commander on duty in the Southern
Hemisphere has been monitoring activities in East Ghormel on
the Worldwide Intelligence Broadcast (WIB) . The WIB is a
database of current information on a variety of topics that
are continuously updated by every intelligence agency in the
government. This all-source fusion is graded for accuracy and
filed in multilevel categories for ease of sorting for any
intelligence detail the commander requests. Based on
comparison of State Department reports, Defense Intelligence
Agency summaries , and Central Intelligence Agency accounts, he
notices that today's evaluation of military activity in East
Ghormel indicates an increased movement level in the Northern
Province
.
Sorting for specific weapon threats in this area, he
notes the presence of PR-8 nuclear devices manufactured by an
East European country. Hypertexting to related information
reveals the date of delivery of the devices, their most recent
employment, and material composition. Sorting the database
again, he discovers the name of the province commander and is
able to hypertext search for biographical information, and
recent contacts in the U.S. A former ambassador to East
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Ghormel, now serving in Switzerland is given as the best
source of personal information on the province commander.
As the Brigade Commander leaves his quarters, his
commander's badge signals the tenant computer to record his
most recent planning activities in memory for immediate
retrieval, to secure his wall display to prevent use by anyone
else, and to distribute the results of his information
searches to members of his staff whom he has previously
designated as recipients . This technique keeps his staff
thinking with him and saves them time conducting similar
searches
.
When the Brigade Commander Arrives in his Operations
Center, the tenant computer, alerted by a signal from the
commander's badge, automatically registers him. This routes
all incoming calls to the nearest communications device, calls
up his most recent planning activities from memory, and
updates previously designated critical information
requirements on displays in whatever area he moves into.
2. The Staff
The Brigade Staff, operating in a free-flow planning
environment, have followed their commanders 's intelligence
search and have already taken action on several matters. The
G-2 is arranging a video-conference with the former ambassador
over broadband link, a secure communications channel with
sufficient multiplexed capacity to be transparent to the user,
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to discuss the Province Commander's personality and
background. The G-3 has obtained still photos with analyst
notations of the PR-8 sites from Washington D.C. The photos
are almost immediately flashed to forward-based reconnaissance
teams in the area for on-site observation. Their picture
overlay reports will be transmitted back from their digitized
chalkboards and integrated immediately into the developing
intelligence picture. The weapons employment officer is
working on a computer-animated operation plan for distribution
to subordinate commands. The Operations Chief is almost
finished integrating a three-dimensional display of the target
area linking terrain database input with weather data and
current enemy and friendly force distributions.
The work of all staff members is meshed by the staff
-
planning network, which uses key-word indicators to provide
intra-staff prompts to keep each staff member focused on the
common goal. The status of each member's effort posts to a
common wall-size screen where the Chief of Staff monitors the
entire endeavor, providing guidance as necessary. Issues to
be addressed by separate staff members are listed on the
margins of the main screen by anyone who perceives a gap in
the planning. All logistical implications are sorted
automatically in each member's work area and forwarded to the




3 . The Plan
Upon entering the operations center, the Brigade
Commander confers with the Chief of Staff to discuss his
intentions. The main display screen responds to voice
commands while the two officers adjust planning priorities and
answer staff queries. The Commander conducts a brief
conference brainstorming session via the broadband net with
subject matter experts in several agencies in CONUS . Their
common planning screen is a section of the wall-size screen in
the operations center.
With recently updated guidance from the NCA, the
Commander's critical parameters are fed into the adaptive
intelligence processor, affectionately known as Napoleon. Its
expert system module produces recommended actions and
alternatives . These are routed into the neural network module
where, based on experience with similar parameters and
recommended actions, the results are forecast. Napoleon is
flexible enough to allow reprogramming of certain parameters
to determine thresholds for pivotal outcomes . These wargaming
scenarios are transmitted to subordinate commanders with
annotated comments of the Brigade Commander. The subordinate
units are small and armed with a limited amount of smart
weapons, relying on the thoroughness of their plan, the
accuracy of their weapons, and the quality of their training.
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4. The Results
This scenario is certainly futuristic and most likely
not accurate in many aspects concerning the information
processing capabilities 2 years from now. The particular
technology employed is not significant, but the shift in focus
of the players. No longer will the crush of information
overload be the primary contribution of the computer age.
Instead, the ubiquitous computer will make obtaining and
fusing information trivial. The computers will quickly and
sometimes automatically handle the routine and currently time-
consuming chores of information processing. Humans will be
set free to use their brain power for the really important
tasks of making judgments and determining priorities. People,
not machines, will again become the focus in command and
control. The full attention of the human brain may again be
applied to conducting war.
...the conduct of war is ultimately an art, an
activity of human creativity and intuition
powered by the strength of the human will.
The art of war requires the intuitive ability
to grasp the essence of a unique battlefield
situation, the creative ability to devise a
practical solution, and the strength of
purpose to execute the act. (FMFM 1, 1989, p.
15)
The part to by played by computers and communications
in future C2 is a supporting role. It is a vital role,
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however. It is the role of freeing creative ability to again
dominate the battlefield.
E. C2 FOR 2010
1. Forecasting Requirements
How can one forecast what C2 needs will be 20 years
from now? How can one predict what technologies to develop to
meet those needs? These are difficult, if not impossible
questions to answer with any accuracy. Yet, that is precisely
what current procurement practices attempt. The development
schedule for a C2 system may span up to 10 years. With new
generations of computer and communications technology
appearing every 15-18 months, the unfortunate result is C2
systems that are planned 10 years ahead of their need with
technology that will be 5-7 generations old by the time it is
fielded. Given the shrinking defense budget and restrictive
acquisition regulations, is there any solution?
2. A Proposal
a. .Requirements and Technology
Shrinking budgets and restrictive regulations may
make a solution difficult to determine, but an optimizing
strategy is appropriate. Expense and long development times
for new technologies have been suggested as the roadblocks to
more modern and effective C2 equipment. This should not lead
to the conclusion that technology should drive operational
requirements. The opposite is true. Operational requirements
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must always drive the selection if not the development of
technology. A sound strategy, then, would be to evaluate C2
functions and attempt to match available technologies to each
function.
The Marine Corps LAN is a good example of this
procedure. A major function of C2 is information processing.
In recent years, the volume of information to process has
overwhelmed the information system capacity. With limited
research and development costs, the LAN, an application from
the business world, was procured and employed with impressive
results. It has some limitations that need to be addressed.
However, its advantages are hard to ignore. It works
relatively well and it is available now .
Jb. Planned Incremental Modernization
This procedure needs to be employed in a more
general manner to command and control systems. A working
group of knowledgeable Marines in the field of command and
control functions should establish current requirements
without concern for the equipment or procedures currently
being used. Then, appropriate equipment and procedures can be
matched to those requirements. This procedure should be
repeated at least once within each generation of computer and
communications technology. This allows rapid application of
new technology to C2 systems. Not every new technology will
be both applicable and affordable. Also, each new addition to
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the C2 architecture must be interoperable with existing
systems. This strategy is called Planned Incremental
Modernization (PIM) in the logistics world.
c. Facility
The demonstration facility suggested in Chapter 4
for use in training C2 staffs would be an excellent laboratory
for evaluating C2 requirements. Additionally, new
technologies could be demonstrated easily in a realistic
environment to determine their value. This C2 laboratory
could be the spawning ground for improved procedures to employ
Marine forces more efficiently on future battlefields using
the best suited equipment within the limited procurement
dollars available.
3 . Looking Ahead
Frequently the impact of new technology on warfare has
not been immediately appreciated. Examples are numerous:
• the swiftness of the chariot
• the accuracy and range of the rifled musket
• the dominating shock effect of the tank
• the coordinating power of radio
• the accuracy and usefulness of radar
• the effectiveness of carrier aircraft
• the stealthful strike of the submarine
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Could information technology be the smart weapon of
the next war? While innovative leaders focus on the future to
chart a course for the present, they must maintain an
advantage in the C2 decision cycle. Let it not be said that
Marines failed to understand the impact of this new technology




APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ANGLICO Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
ATO Air Tasking Order
BSSG Brigade Service Support Group
C2 Command and Control
CENTCOM Central Command
COC Combat Operations Center
CSC Computer Supported Collaboration
DFASC Deployable Force Automated Service Center
DSA Division Support Area
EIS Executive Information System
ES Expert System
FSSG Force Service Support Group
GDSS Group Decision Support System
GMF Ground Mobile Forces
HW Hardwire or Hardware
IFASC Interim Force Automated Service Center
MAG Marine Air Group
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force
MAW Marine Air Wing
MCDN Marine Corps Data Network
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
MSE Main Subordinate Element
NCA National Command Authority
OODA Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action
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RASC Regional Automated Support Center
SCI Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence
SWA Southwest Asia
T/E Table of Equipment
T/0 Table of Organization
TACC Tactical Air Command Center
TAOC Tactical Air Operations Center
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APPENDIX B: DEFINITIONS
All taken from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Control Master




A 4.4 to 5.0 GHz communications system that receives
and transmits voice and data signals in troposcatter
and line of sight modes. It provides 12 channels of
teletype, or 12/24 channels of time division
multiplexed/pulse code modulated traffic.
Deployable, tempest-certified desktop and portable





A nodal or point to point terminal capable of
transmitting and receiving 6-24 channels on a single
carrier. Uses eight foot ground-mount antenna.
AN/TSC-85 A nodal or point to point trunking terminal capable
Satellite of transmitting a single, multiplexed, high-data-
Communication rate carrier frequencies (6-48 channels) and
Terminal receiving up to four independent carrier frequencies
(6-24 channels) . As a hub terminal, can
simultaneously communicate with four AN/TSC-93 spoke
terminals. Uses eight foot ground-mount antenna.
AN/TRC-170 A 4.4 to 5.0 GHz line of sight or troposcatter,
Troposcatter radio terminal set being developed under the TRI-TAC
Radio Set program. It provides the capability for
transmission and reception of digital voice, analog
voice, quasi-analog and digital data signals at
ranges out to 100 miles. It is secured by the KG-58
(voice) and KG-84 (data) and will eventually replace
the AN/GRC-2 01.
AUTODIN A worldwide data communications network of the
Defense Communications System; acronym for AUTOmatic
Digital Network.
AUTOVON A worldwide automatic communications system for end-
to-end circuit-switched voice connections to the
Defense Communications System. Acronym for
AUTOmatic Voice Network.
Digital A lightweight, handheld, message processor for fixed
Communication or variable format messages. Provides netted or
Terminal point to point communications over a variety of
radios or wire.
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MRC-135 Mobile, VHF/FM multi-channel analog radio. It
Radio Set provides eight 3 KHz voice channels to a distance of
20 miles.
STU III Secure Telephone Unit with internal modem providing
transmission rate of 2400 bps.
TSEC/KY-68 A terminal containing the audio-processing,
Digital signaling, and cryptographic functions necessary to
Subscriber provide secure and non-secure telephone and data







A device for encryption of TTY and data traffic on
netted and point to point circuits.
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Appendix C: INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
1. "Often, the target intelligence received from higher-level
sources at the division—necessary to conduct effective targeting
—
was outdated." "In general, our ability to disseminate targeting
information efficiently requires closer scrutiny." (Mazzara, 1991)
2. "Battle damage assessment, however, was seldom available in a
timely manner at the division level or below. We can fix this
through increased emphasis on the downward push of this information
at all levels, as well as with the assistance of digital command-
and-control equipment." (Mazzara, 1991)
3. "We've reported 'unexplained' incidents and patrol contacts
almost every night. No analysis, no support, no intel, just info."
"Intelligence guys, take off your trench coats, put on your flak
jackets and helmets, and get down." (Huddleston, 1991)
4. "Duplication of effort was widespread as several officers from
different functional areas of the staff pursued the same piece of
information, sometimes a day or more after an issue had been
resolved. The result was a slow, overblown system that wasted
hours of time and energy as information seekers and processors
tried to feed the handful of decision-makers what was vital, while
keeping everybody else in the information loop." (Armstrong, 1991)
5. "There is an increasing demand to transmit greater amounts of
command and control, logistical, and intelligence data via the
airwaves." (Ennis, 1991)
6. "Units designated as the POME (Point Of Main Effort) must be
provided the means to rapidly report and receive information and
intelligence. This includes communications, intelligence
collection assets, and rapid access to all sources of intelligence,
if necessary." (Moore, 1991)
7. "...the ability to fuse intelligence from all sources, identify
that which is needed by various echelons of command, and rapidly
disseminate that information in a usable form, both afloat and
ashore, is critical to success." (Bierly and Seal, 1991)
8. During Desert Storm/Desert Shield, weather data such as winds,
cloud cover, and visibility, took too long to obtain. (MCLLS)
9. During the war, dissemination of intelligence, once it was
obtained, was a problem. (MCLLS)
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10. Remotely Piloted Vehicle information flow needs to be improved
in two areas: the flow of flight control information from the
information users to the pilots and the flow of target location
information from the pilots to the users. (MCLLS)
11. During the war, bomb damage assessment (BDA) choked
communications channels largely because duplicate information was
submitted by different sources. (MCLLS)
12. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, information flow between
operations and intelligence sections was less than desired.
(MCLLS)
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APPENDIX D: COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION SOURCE









ORDER OF BATTLE HANDBOOK
DIA FACTBOOK, SPOT REPS





SALUTE REPS, SHELL REPS
SPOT REPS, DISUMS,
INTSUMS CI REPS, ITU REPS
LOGISTICAL INTELLIGENCE
TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS- ROUTES
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF
REAR AREA
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF CSSA
STOCKPILES
VULNERABILITY TO LANDING SUPPORT OPS
TERRAIN ANALYSIS,
TACTICAL MAPS, SALUTE
REP, SPOT REPS, SHELL
REPS
SALUTE REPS, SPOT REPS




EXPLOITATION OF URBAN AREAS
FACILITIES
COMMUNICATIONS
SUPPLY CLASSES I, II, IV
DIA FACTBOOKS, TERRAIN
ANALYSIS




FACILITIES (CPs, AIRFIELDS, HLZs, VEH PARKS, ETC.)
TYPE SALUTE REPS, DISUMS,
INTSUMS,




WHAT CAN HE DO?
WHEN CAN HE DO IT?










(ATK, DEF, DEL, ETC.)
LOC OF MAIN ATK
TYPE OF UNITS/STRENGTH
























TERRAIN, INTELL, & AMPHIB
































































MEF & DIV OP AND FRAG
ORDERS






































































MEF & DIV OPERATION AND
FRAG ORDERS






















AMMO STAT (BA & DOAS;








































AMMO STAT (BA & DOAS)













































SPOT & CAS REPS
SPOT & CAS REPS








PWS CAPTURED SUBORDINATE UNIT SPOT
REPS
LOGISTICS




























CLOCKS (LOCAL & "Z";




Source: USMC OH 6-1A
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